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 External auditors’ reliance on internal audit: the impact of sourcing 
arrangements and consulting activities 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the impact of internal audit outsourcing and internal audit’s 
involvement in consulting on external auditors’ reliance on the work of internal audit. 
We test whether these factors influence (i) reliance on internal audit work already 
undertaken and (ii) the use of internal auditors as assistants. In each case, we 
distinguish between control evaluation and substantive testing. We find that 
involvement in consulting impacts reliance on work undertaken and the use of internal 
auditors as assistants for control evaluation. External auditors make greater use of 
internal auditors as assistants for substantive testing when internal audit is provided 
in-house. Overall, external auditors use internal audit more for control evaluation 
tasks than for substantive testing.   
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1. Introduction 
Think something like this needs to be included relating it to ISA610 – which I 
can’t get access too but assume ASA610 is similar 
 Although the external auditor is solely responsible for the audit report 
consideration of the activities of internal audit and their effect on the external audit 
procedures is required (ASA 610). The role and objectives of the internal audit 
function is primarily determined by those charged with governance and management, 
whilst the primary objective of the external auditor is to express an opinion on the 
financial report. However, some of the means of achieving the respective objectives 
are often similar and certain aspects of internal audit may be useful for determining 
the nature, timing and extent of external audit procedures (ASA 610). 
 
Reliance on the work of internal audit affects the nature, timing and extent of 
audit procedures performed by the external auditor and, as such, can have a 
significant impact on audit fees (Felix et al., 2005 and 2001).  Hence, the extent to 
which the external auditor relies on internal audit work is a key audit planning 
decision. In recent years, however, internal audit activities have been extended so that 
the function no longer has a narrow focus based on evaluating and strengthening 
internal controls (Gramling et al., 2004, Cohen et al., 2004).  This is reflected in the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) definition of internal auditing which stresses that 
internal audit is both an assurance activity and a consulting activity (IIA, 1999), 
playing a key role in corporate governance and risk management.  At the same time, 
the practice of outsourcing internal audit has become increasingly prevalent (Glover 
et al., 2008; Ernst & Young, 2006), with internal audit services being offered by 
specialist providers as well as by more traditional accounting firms.  These changes in 
the role of internal audit are likely to impact external auditors’ reliance decisions. 
While there have been three decades of research exploring external auditors’ 
reliance on the work of internal audit (for example, Clark et al., 1980; Schneider, 
1985; Margheim, 1986; Whittington and Margheim, 1993; Gramling et al., 2004), 
much of this research was conducted when internal audit had a narrower focus and 
was only offered in-house. Both the provision of consulting services by the internal 
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audit function and the sourcing arrangement of internal audit have the potential to 
impact internal audit objectivity. Hence, they could influence external auditors’ 
decisions to rely on the work of internal audit. In this study, we use an experimental 
design to examine the impact of these two factors on external auditors’ reliance 
decisions.  
We extend prior research in a number of key ways. First, our consulting 
manipulation examines the impact of an internal audit function that has been actively 
engaged in systems consulting in relation to the financial systems, an issue not 
addressed in prior research.  Second, in contrast to prior studies, our sourcing 
arrangement manipulation involves the use of a specialist internal audit firm rather 
than an accounting firm as the external provider (Glover et al., 2008; Gramling and 
Vandervelde, 2006). Even though outsourcing to specialist firms is becoming more 
common, external auditors’ perceptions of this practice have not previously been 
investigated. In addition, this manipulation allows us to remove the possibility of 
group affiliation bias which can arise when auditors rely on work outsourced to 
another auditing firm (Gramling and Vandervelde, 2006). Third, by investigating the 
sourcing arrangement and the provision of consulting services together in a 2 x 2 
experiment, we are able to examine whether they have a joint effect on the dependent 
variables and, if so, whether this effect is interactive or additive (DeZoort et al., 
2001).   
A fourth contribution is that we provide a more in-depth analysis of external 
auditors’ reliance decisions by examining the impact of internal audit on four separate 
decisions. These include the decision to rely on work already undertaken by internal 
audit and the decision to utilise internal auditors to perform certain audit tasks. For 
both of these decisions, we further differentiate between control evaluation work and 
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substantive testing of balances.  No prior studies have used these four reliance 
decisions as dependent variables in the one study. However, previous research has 
found that the impact of factors affecting external auditors’ reliance on internal audit 
can differ between control evaluation and substantive testing (Margheim, 1986; Mills, 
1996) and between reliance on work undertaken by internal audit and using internal 
auditors as assistants (Margheim and Label; 1990).   
We manipulate (i) internal audit involvement in systems consulting activities at 
either a high involvement role or no involvement and (ii) sourcing arrangement as the 
internal audit function either being provided in-house or by a specialist internal audit 
and business risk consulting firm. We examine the effect of these factors on the four 
reliance decisions noted above. We find that internal audit involvement in systems 
consulting impacts the extent of external auditor reliance on the work of internal audit 
for control evaluation but not for substantive testing of balances. However, whether 
the function is outsourced or provided in-house has little impact on reliance decisions.  
An exception is that external auditors are more likely to use in-house internal auditors 
to assist with substantive testing, suggesting an availability influence. In addition, our 
results indicate that external auditors are more likely to use internal audit for control 
evaluation work than for substantive testing of account balances.  …these last two 
sentences seem to be contradictory??  Maybe explain further somehow?? Further, 
there are no significant differences between external auditors’ use of work already 
undertaken by internal auditors and their use of internal auditors as assistants.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses 
prior research and develops the hypotheses. The third section explains the research 
methods while the results of the study are reported and discussed in the fourth section. 
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In the final section, some conclusions are drawn, the limitations of the study are 
acknowledged and suggestions for future research are provided.  
 
2. Background and hypothesis development 
The current governance environment has led to an increased emphasis on the 
relationship between internal and external auditors (Gramling et al., 2004). The 
economic benefits of external auditors’ reliance on internal audit work are well 
recognised (Glover et al., 2008). For example, Felix et al. (2001) found that audit fees 
were approximately 18% lower when external auditors coordinated their work with 
internal audit.   
International auditing standard ISA 610 requires external auditors to evaluate 
four factors when considering whether internal audit work is adequate for the purpose 
of their audit. These factors are objectivity, technical competence, due professional 
care and communication (ISA 610, 2009). In a similar vein, current US standards 
require external auditors to consider the competence, objectivity and work performed 
by internal auditors when making reliance decisions (AU Section 322, AICPA 1991; 
PCAOB, 2007).  The international standard does not deal with instances when internal 
auditors assist the external auditor to undertake specific audit tasks. However, the US 
standard currently recognises that the external auditor may use internal auditors as 
assistants to obtain an understanding of controls, to test controls and to perform 
substantive tests. When direct assistance is provided, the standard requires the auditor 
to assess internal audit competence and objectivity.  
External auditors’ reliance decisions have been the focus of a large body of 
research, with much of the early work examining the extent to which auditors 
consider the key factors of objectivity, competence and work performed (see 
Gramling et al., 2004).  More recently, … but 2001 is not more recent than 2004???  
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other factors have been explored, including the level of coordination between internal 
and external audit (Felix et al., 2001), internal audit remuneration incentives (DeZoort 
et al., 2001), whether internal audit has primarily an auditing focus or a consulting 
focus (DeZoort et al., 2001), internal audit sourcing arrangement (Glover et al., 2008), 
task subjectivity (Glover et al., 2008; DeZoort et al., 2001), inherent risk (Glover et 
al., 2008; Felix et al., 2001), non-audit services (Felix et al., 2005) and client pressure 
to use internal audit services (Felix et al., 2005).   
In general, two main dependent variables have been used in prior studies. These 
are the extent or degree of reliance on internal audit and the reduction in budgeted 
audit hours resulting from such reliance. Very few studies have distinguished between 
reliance on work already performed by internal audit and using internal auditors as 
assistants (Abdel-Khalik et al., 1983; Margheim and Label, 1990) and between 
control evaluation tasks and substantive testing of balances ((Margheim, 1986; Mills, 
1996). As noted, no prior research has examined all four reliance decisions in a single 
study. 
2.1. Consulting role of internal audit 
 
The IIA definition of internal auditing highlights the role of internal audit as a 
provider of consulting services as well as the more traditional assurance services. The 
change in definition is consistent with a more value-added emphasis being placed on 
the internal audit function (Brody and Lowe, 2000; Cashell and Aldhizer III, 2002). 
Research by Nagy and Cenker (2002) indicates that the change in definition simply 
reflects existing practice, with internal auditors having performed consulting services 
and other value-added activities for many years. However, concern has been 
expressed about the ability of internal auditors to maintain the desired level of 
objectivity when acting as both consultants and assurers (Brody and Lowe, 2000).  
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DeZoort et al. (2001) argue that a consulting role for internal audit involves 
participation in management decision making and the development of close working 
relationships with management, leading to a reluctance to report negative findings.  
Further, a self-review threat exists when internal auditors are involved in financial 
systems design and then at a later stage are required to audit these systems (Plumlee, 
1985; Church and Schneider, 1992).   
Only a small number of research studies have addressed this problem and results 
have been mixed. Plumlee (1985) found that internal auditors who reviewed a system 
they had helped to design perceived internal controls to be stronger and were less 
critical of control weaknesses than those who were not reviewing their own work. In 
contrast, Church and Schneider (1992) failed to find support for their prediction that 
internal auditors would allocate fewer audit hours to investigate irregularities when 
they had been involved in designing internal controls.  They suggest that this may 
indicate that internal auditors do not allow themselves to be influenced by their 
involvement in systems design because they are cognizant of their need to maintain 
objectivity. 
Both Brody and Lowe (2000) and Ahlawat and Lowe (2004) examined whether 
internal auditors remain objective when consulting to management in a corporate 
acquisition setting.  Both studies found that the role the company was taking in the 
negotiation process influenced participants’ judgments, suggesting that internal 
auditors who act as consultants may not be able to maintain their objectivity.  
DeZoort et al. (2001) tested whether internal audit participation in consulting, 
together with eligibility for incentive compensation, influenced external audit reliance 
decisions. Although they found that external auditors perceived that a consulting role 
would reduce internal audit objectivity and increase the likelihood of acquiescence to 
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management, consulting had little effect on actual reliance and planning decisions. 
They speculate that a possible reason for their unexpected result is that, at the time of 
their study, external auditors actively provided consulting services to their audit 
clients, making them less sensitive to the likelihood of bias. Hence, these findings 
may not hold in the current environment where external auditors no longer engage in 
the extensive provision of non-audit services.  
DeZoort et al. (2001) manipulated the overall time spent on consulting activities 
rather than involvement in the design of a system which the internal auditor may 
subsequently need to audit. The present study examines whether internal audit 
involvement in consultancy activities specifically relating to financial systems would 
influence external auditors’ reliance on the work of internal audit.  Further, it is 
undertaken at a time when the provision of non-audit services to audit clients is no 
longer considered appropriate. In this context, we predict that external auditors will be 
reluctant to rely on the work of internal auditors who have been directly involved with 
the design of financial systems. We also expect that they will be less likely to use 
these internal auditors as assistants. We therefore test the following hypotheses: 
H1:   External auditors are more likely to rely on work already undertaken by 
internal audit when internal auditors do not perform a systems consulting role 
compared to when they do perform such a role. 
H2:   External auditors are more likely to utilise internal audit to assist in 
performing audit tasks when internal auditors do not perform a systems consulting 
role compared to when they do perform such a role. 
 
2.2. Internal audit sourcing arrangement 
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Outsourcing of internal audit activities has become commonplace in recent years 
(Ernst & Young, 2006; Caplan and Kirschenheiter, 2000). While it is no longer 
acceptable for external auditors to provide internal audit services to their audit clients 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, (SOX), 2002), outsourcing services are provided both by public 
accounting firms to non-audit clients and by specialist internal audit firms (Ernst & 
Young, 2006).   
It has been argued that an in-house internal audit function may be less objective 
than an outsourced function as it is difficult for an employee to be truly independent 
of management (James, 2003; Glover et al., 2008; Ahlawat and Lowe, 2004). It has 
also been suggested that outside internal audit providers, particularly the large 
accounting firms, offer high quality services and may have a greater level of 
expertise, especially with regard to specialist knowledge such as technology skills 
(Caplan and Kirschenheiter, 2000).1 However, outside providers lack the in-depth 
company knowledge possessed by in-house internal auditors (James, 2003). This 
reflects the IIA (1994) argument that a competent in-house internal audit department 
“can perform the internal auditing function more efficiently and effectively than a 
contracted audit service” (IIA, 1994, p. 2).   
Felix et al. (2001) report that the contribution of internal audit to the external 
audit is related to the availability of internal auditors. It can be argued that in-house 
internal auditors are likely to be more available than those from an outside provider as 
outsourced audit teams have limited contact with the company (James, 2003). Hence, 
availability could lead to greater external auditor reliance on an in-house internal audit 
function, regardless of any differences in perceptions of internal audit quality.  
                                                 
1 This argument is used to support the use of co-sourcing whereby an in-house internal audit function 
uses the services of an outside provider for specialist tasks or at peak times. Co-sourcing is not 
considered in the present study. 
 11
Research evidence relating to the impact of internal audit outsourcing on 
external auditors’ decisions to rely on internal audit work is limited to just two 
studies. Glover et al. (2008) predict that external auditors rely more on work 
performed by outsourced internal auditors than by in-house internal auditors because 
the latter are closely aligned with management. Their results support this prediction 
but only when inherent risk is high. Gramling and Vandervelde (2006) found a group 
affiliation bias when internal audit services are performed by another public 
accounting firm. Both internal and external auditors participated in their study, with 
the external auditors assessing internal audit objectivity to be higher when the 
provider was another accounting firm and the internal auditors assessing objectivity to 
be higher when internal audit was provided in-house. Given that the outsourcing 
arrangement in Glover et al. (2008) was also to a Big Four accounting firm, the 
presence of a group affiliation bias in that study cannot be ruled out. 
In the present study, we minimise the likelihood of group affiliation bias by 
designating the outside provider as a specialist internal audit and business risk 
consulting firm rather than a public accounting firm.  Furthermore, we contrast the 
outside provider with a high quality, well resourced in-house internal audit function to 
assess whether external auditors’ reliance decisions are affected by the sourcing 
arrangement in these circumstances.  
In light of the arguments presented above, we predict that external auditors 
would perceive a specialist internal audit consulting firm to be more independent than 
an in-house internal audit function. As such, they are likely to rely on work already 
undertaken by internal audit when the function is outsourced. However, following 
Felix et al. (2001 and 2005), we expect that the greater availability of in-house 
internal auditors is likely to lead to a greater use of internal auditors as assistants 
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compared to when internal audit is outsourced. This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
H3:   External auditors are more likely to rely on work already undertaken by 
internal audit when the internal audit function is outsourced to a specialist provider 
compared to when it is provided in-house. 
H4: External auditors are more likely to utilise internal audit to assist in 
performing audit tasks when the internal audit function is provided in-house 
compared to when it is outsourced to a specialist provider.  
 
2.3. The joint effect of sourcinge arrangement and consulting role 
 
DeZoort et al. (2001) draw on attribution theory and other psychology research 
to argue that external auditor reliance on the work of internal audit should decrease in 
proportion to the number of incentives that internal auditors have to bias their reports. 
However, they find an unexpected interaction between their independent variables of 
internal audit participation in consulting activities and entitlement to incentive 
compensation. The authors tentatively suggest that this might be because external 
auditors are reluctant to reduce their own testing beyond a minimum threshold. In the 
context of our study, we therefore explore, without making a prediction, whether there 
is an interaction between sourcing arrangement and involvement in consulting 
activities. This gives rise to the following research question: 
RQ1:   Is there an interaction effect between involvement in consulting activities 
and sourcing arrangement on external auditors’ reliance decisions?   
 
3. Research methods 
In order to test our hypotheses, we use a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, resulting 
in four cases. The first manipulation is whether or not internal audit performs a 
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systems consulting role with respect to the company’s financial system. The internal 
audit sourcing arrangement is manipulated as being in-house or outsourced to a 
specialist provider. The research instrument was tested using a group of final year 
auditing students, academics with auditing experience and four audit practitioners. 
The preliminary testing confirmed the strength of the manipulations. However, as the 
study was not administered in a controlled environment, we did not include specific 
manipulation checks to minimise the possibility of demand effects.2  
 
3.2. Participants  
 
Participants in the study consisted of 17 partners, 29 managers and 20 seniors 
from the Big Four and two mid-tier audit firms in five major Australian cities. A 
partner in each firm agreed to distribute copies of the instrument to colleagues who 
had clients with an internal audit function. Responses were mailed directly to the 
researchers in a reply-paid envelope.  A total of 98 instruments were distributed, with 
66 usable responses being received, giving a response rate of 67%.   
While the mid-tier firms agreed to participate, only four responses were received 
from these firms, owing to a lack of clients with internal audit functions.3  
Approximately 58% of participants were males. Responses with respect to age group 
indicated that 51.5% were between 21 and 30, 28.8% were between 31 and 40 and 
19.7% were over 40 years of age.  The mean years of experience were 10.8, ranging 
from a minimum of two years to a maximum of 36 years.  The number of clients 
using internal auditors varied from one to twelve, with a mean of four. Analyses of 
                                                 
2 Data for another study on external auditors’ reliance decisions was collected in the same research 
instrument. Hence the instrument contained two scenarios, each followed by a series of questions. To 
reduce the risk of confounding effects, the four versions of one scenario were randomly mixed with the 
four versions of the other. This resulted in 16 versions of the instrument. Importantly, it should be 
noted that we did not change the order of the two scenarios and hence there are no order effects to 
consider.  
3 We also test our hypotheses omitting these four respondents. Results are reported in footnotes 4 and 
5. 
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variance (ANOVA) and co-variance (ANCOVA) were used to test for differences in 
responses due to firm, rank, age, gender and experience.  None of these factors had a 
significant impact on our reported results.    
 
 
 
3.3. The scenario  
 
The scenario used in the experiment described a listed company in the paper 
packaging industry. Background information indicated that the company was 
profitable, with a sound performance trend and strong corporate governance. Over the 
last two years, the company had been installing enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
technology to integrate its business and information processes, including its financial 
systems. Participants were told that their firm had recently been appointed as auditor 
and the client’s management had expressed a desire for a close working relationship 
between external and internal audit. This would involve the exchange of audit plans, 
programs, findings and reports. The firm had also been asked to consider the extent to 
which the audit team could rely on the work of internal audit.  
 
3.4. Independent variables 
 
The first independent variable is internal audit’s involvement or otherwise in a 
systems consulting role. In the consulting role condition, participants were told that 
approximately 50% of internal audit time was devoted to assurance work and 50% to 
systems consulting.  Internal audit had been heavily involved in installing ERP 
technology to integrate its business and information processes, including its financial 
systems.  During the system-design phase, internal audit assisted in the establishment 
of system access for employees and in the development of the user authorisation 
request and approval process.  In addition, the internal audit information systems 
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specialists had just designed and implemented an analysis tool to test segregation of 
duty controls at various transaction levels.  In the alternative treatment condition, 
participants were told that approximately 50% of internal audit time was devoted to 
assurance work and 50% to special projects such as performance audits.  A similar 
description of the ERP installation was provided but, in this treatment, the company 
had engaged outside systems consultants from a large professional services firm.   
The second independent variable is the sourcing arrangement. In the in-house 
provider condition, the company was described as having its own internal audit 
function with eight full time permanent staff and a budget of $1.25 million. The Chief 
Audit Executive had more than ten years experience in internal audit and was a 
Certified Internal Auditor.  He reported to the managing director on an administrative 
basis and functionally to the audit committee. The other staff were all qualified in 
either accounting or information systems. There were two internal audit managers 
with more than six years internal audit experience while the experience of the other 
staff ranged from one to five years. This description was designed to portray a well 
staffed, experienced and adequately resourced internal audit function. In the 
outsourced provider condition, participants were informed that the company did not 
have its own internal audit function but that it outsourced internal audit activities from 
a leading internal audit and business risk consulting firm. The partner-in-charge of 
internal audit services reported to the managing director on an administrative basis 
and functionally to the audit committee.  Again, the internal audit budget was $1.25 
million. A specialist internal audit and business risk firm was chosen to reduce the 
possibility of “group affiliation” bias (Gramling and Vandervelde, 2006, p. 28) 
resulting from using a public accounting firm.  
 
3.5. Dependent variables 
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Participants were asked to provide preliminary assessments of the extent to 
which they would be prepared to rely on work already undertaken by internal audit 
and also the extent to which they would be prepared to use internal audit to assist in 
performing audit tasks. In each case, these questions were divided into two parts, the 
first relating to the evaluation of internal financial controls and the second to 
substantive tests of account balances. For all four dependent variables, an 11-point 
scale was provided, with end points of zero (to a very limited extent) and ten (to a 
very great extent). 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 summarises the descriptive statistics for the four dependent variables.  
These statistics provide useful insights into external auditors’ reliance decisions in the 
Australian context. Panel A reports the means and standard deviations for external 
auditors’ reliance on work already undertaken by internal audit while Panel B reports 
the same statistics for using internal auditors as assistants. It can be seen from Panel A 
that the means across the four treatment groups for reliance on work already 
undertaken by internal auditors range from 5.53 to 6.69 for control evaluation and 
3.47 to 4.44 for substantive testing. Panel B of Table 2 shows that the means across 
the treatment groups for using internal auditors as assistants vary from 4.74 to 6.88 for 
control evaluation work and from 3.67 to 5.31 for substantive testing work.   
Prior to examining the impact of the independent variables on the four reliance 
decisions, it is interesting to further explore the overall differences between the four 
decisions. Given that each participant responded to each of the reliance decisions, we 
are able to conduct paired sample t-tests to identify differences in their responses.  
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First, we test for differences between control evaluation work and substantive 
testing of balances. The results of paired sample t-tests are reported in Panel A of 
Table 2.  Panel A shows that the differences in the overall means for both reliance on 
work already undertaken by internal auditors and the use of internal auditors as 
assistants are statistically significant (p < 0.001).   
It is also interesting to note that the standard deviations for control evaluation 
are smaller than those for substantive testing, indicating less variability in responses 
relating to control evaluation. The frequency distribution for control evaluation for 
work already undertaken by internal audit (untabulated) indicates that almost 70% of 
responses exceed the midpoint of five while only 14% of participants selected three or 
less. In contrast, the frequency distribution for substantive testing indicates that 47% 
of participants selected three or less, with only 39% of responses exceeding the 
midpoint of five.  Similarly, the frequency distributions for using internal auditors as 
assistants (untabulated) indicate that 68% of responses exceed the midpoint of 5 for 
control evaluation, compared to 35% for substantive testing. The percentage of 
participants selecting 3 or less amounted to 18% for control evaluation and 38% for 
substantive testing. Hence, it is clear that participants are more likely to rely on 
internal audit for control evaluation work than for substantive testing of balances. 
This finding could reflect the perception that internal auditors are likely to have 
greater expertise in internal control work than in substantive testing.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the results of paired-sample t-tests between relying 
on work already undertaken by internal auditors and using internal auditors as 
assistants. Panel B indicates that the differences in means for both control evaluation 
work and substantive testing of balances are not statistically significant.  This finding 
is interesting given that the Australian standard only focuses on external auditors’ 
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reliance on work already undertaken and does not consider the use of internal auditors 
as assistants. Our results suggest that, in spite of the lack of guidance provided by 
auditing standards, external auditors are comfortable with the practice of using 
internal auditors as assistants. This is particularly so for control evaluation work. 
 
 
4.2. Analysis of variance 
 
Table 3 reports the results of the analysis of variance used to test the hypotheses. 
Panel A shows that internal audit involvement with systems consulting has a 
significant impact on external auditors’ reliance decisions for control evaluation (p = 
0.008) but not for substantive testing. Thus, there is support for H1 for control 
evaluation but not for substantive tests of balances.  However, there are no significant 
differences between the two types of sourcing arrangement. Thus H3 is not supported. 
The interaction effects between the two independent variables are not significant for 
either of the reliance decisions.4  
Panel B reports the test results for H2 and H4 relating to the use of internal audit 
as assistants in performing audit tasks.  Similar to the results in Panel A, only the 
consulting role manipulation is significantly different for control evaluation work. 
However, there is a marginally significant difference (p = 0.054) for the source 
provider manipulation with respect to substantive testing of balances. The means 
reported in Table 2 indicate that participants believe that they are more likely to use 
internal auditors as assistants for substantive testing when internal audit services are 
provided in-house compared to when they are outsourced. This result suggests that the 
availability of internal auditors to act as assistants impacts external auditors’ 
                                                 
4 We obtain similar results when omitting the four participants from mid-tier audit firms.  Sourcing 
arrangement remains insignificant for both types of testing. Involvement in consulting is significant at 
p = .015 for control evaluation and is not significant for substantive testing. Neither of the interaction 
effects is significant. 
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willingness to use them to assist with this type of testing. Hence, H2 is supported for 
control evaluation but not substantive testing. In contrast, H4 is supported only for 
substantive testing.  Again, the interaction effects are not significant.5 
Overall, these results indicate that participants were insensitive to possible 
differences in internal audit objectivity arising from the sourcing arrangement. This 
suggests that external auditors regard internal audit services provided by a high 
quality in-house function to have similar standards of objectivity to those that are 
outsourced to a specialist internal audit and business risk firm. This finding is 
interesting as it contrasts with that of Glover et al. (2008) who found that external 
auditors considered in-house internal auditors to be less objective than when internal 
audit was outsourced to a Big Four accounting firm. The difference in results can be 
explained by Gramling and Vandervelde’s (2006) suggestion that group affiliation 
theory leads external auditors to bias their evaluations of internal audit objectivity 
when the service is performed by a similar public accounting firm. Further 
exploration of these different results is a fruitful avenue for future research. 
Additionally, our finding with respect to using internal auditors as assistants for 
substantive testing work provides further support to Felix et al.’s (2001 and 2005) 
suggestion that this practice is driven by the availability of in-house internal auditors 
to provide such assistance.  
As far as control evaluation work is concerned, external auditors rely less on 
work performed by internal audit and will also use internal auditors as assistants to a 
lesser extent when internal audit has been directly involved in financial systems 
consultancy. This shows that, while external auditors’ reliance decisions in relation to 
                                                 
5 Again, similar results are obtained when omitting the four participants from mid-tier audit firms. 
Sourcing arrangement is not significant for control evaluation and is marginally significant for 
substantive testing (p = .059). Involvement in consulting is significant for control evaluation (p = .002) 
but not for substantive testing. Neither of the interaction effects is significant. 
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substantive testing are not affected by internal auditors’ involvement in systems 
consultancy, they are sensitive to the possibility of internal audit self-review as far as 
evaluating internal controls is concerned. This finding contrasts to that of DeZoort et 
al. (2001) who did not find support for their hypothesis that internal audit engagement 
in consulting activities would influence external auditor reliance decisions. These 
conflicting results could be due to the different nature of the manipulation, with 
DeZoort et al. (2001) manipulating the overall extent of time spent on consulting 
activities by internal audit, compared to the present study’s manipulation of a direct 
involvement in consulting related to the financial system. DeZoort et al. (2001) also 
suggest that their lack of a result may be due to the time period of their study which 
was undertaken at a time when external auditors themselves actively engaged in 
consulting to their audit clients. Given that our study was undertaken more recently 
when the provision of non-audit services is no longer acceptable, it is possible that 
external auditors’ views have changed. Hence, again there is a need for further 
research to explore in greater depth the reason for these contrasting findings.  
While we did not predict any interaction effects between the two factors tested 
in this scenario, it is interesting to note that none of the interactions are significant.  
Hence, the impact of systems consultancy on external auditors’ reliance decisions is 
not dependent on whether internal audit is provided in-house or is outsourced.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study examined two factors that may influence external auditors’ reliance 
on the work of internal audit in the current governance environment.  The internal 
audit sourcing arrangement and internal audit’s involvement in systems consultancy 
were manipulated. The systems consultancy manipulation was significant for control 
evaluation work, both with respect to reliance on work undertaken and using internal 
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auditors as assistants. However, the consultancy manipulation was not significant for 
substantive testing. As far as the sourcing arrangement is concerned, external auditors 
generally do not differentiate between a high quality in-house function and a specialist 
internal audit outsource provider when relying on work already undertaken by internal 
audit. However, a marginally significant finding that external auditors are more 
willing to use internal auditors as assistants for substantive testing work is consistent 
with our prediction that the availability of internal auditors would impact on this 
reliance decision.  
There are a number of limitations of our study which should be borne in mind 
when interpreting the findings. Our sample size is relatively small and, as with all 
experimental designs, the findings of our study may not be generalisable to other 
populations. We did not include manipulation checks in the instrument to avoid the 
possibility of demand effects in a non-controlled experiment. While our preliminary 
testing was designed to confirm the strength of our manipulations, we cannot be 
certain that all participants interpreted the manipulations as intended.  
In spite of these limitations, our results have important implications for 
regulators and others concerned with the role of audit in corporate governance. The 
need for strong governance has led to increasing costs of compliance and hence 
determining the most efficient and effective balance between internal and external 
auditing remains a challenge. The present study highlights some additional factors 
that can affect external auditors’ reliance on internal audit work in the current 
governance environment.  When internal auditors engage in systems consulting, the 
possibility of a self-review threat is likely to reduce their contribution to the external 
audit. Hence, firms need to consider the trade-off between the added value from 
having internal audit engage in consulting activities and the additional external audit 
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fees that could arise because of a lack of reliance on internal audit work.  More in-
depth analysis of this trade-off is an important avenue for future research. 
Further research could also be undertaken to examine other aspects of the 
factors explored in this study.  For example, many firms co-source internal audit 
services from an in-house function and an outside provider but the impact of this 
practice on external auditors’ reliance decisions is relatively unexplored.  The present 
study examined internal audit’s involvement in consultancy directly related to 
financial statement systems. While other studies have examined whether internal 
auditors advocate their firm’s position when advising management, there are many 
other types of consultancy work that could be examined in the context of external 
auditor reliance. For example, internal auditors are playing an increasingly important 
role in risk management but we know little about how this impacts external auditors’ 
decisions to rely on their work. Finally, as noted, the contrasting findings of this study 
with those of two North American studies indicate the need for further research to 
determine more conclusively the causes of these differences. 
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 Table 1 
The impact of outsourcing and consultancy role on external auditors’ reliance 
decisions: Descriptive statistics  
 
Means*, (standard deviations) and cell sizes 
Panel A: Work Already Undertaken by Internal Audit  
 Evaluation of internal controls Substantive tests of balances 
 Consulting 
Role 
No 
Consulting 
Role 
 
Overall Consulting 
Role 
No 
Consulting 
Role 
 
Overall 
Outsourced IA 
Provider 
5.53 
(2.07) 
n = 15 
6.50 
(1.37) 
n = 16 
6.03 
(1.78) 
n = 31 
3.47 
(2.17) 
n = 15 
4.44 
(2.16) 
n =16 
3.97 
(2.18) 
n = 31 
In-house IA 
Provider 
5.53 
(1.87) 
n = 19 
6.69 
(1.58) 
n = 16 
6.06 
(1.81) 
n = 35 
4.63 
(2.57) 
n = 19 
3.75 
(2.89) 
n = 16 
4.23 
(2.71) 
n = 35 
Overall 5.53 
(1.93) 
n = 34 
6.59 
(1.46) 
n = 32 
6.05 
(1.78) 
n = 66 
4.12 
(2.43) 
n = 34 
4.09 
(2.53) 
n = 32 
4.11 
(2.46) 
n = 66 
Panel B: Using Internal Auditors as Assistants
 Evaluation of internal controls Substantive testing of balances 
 Consulting 
Role 
No 
Consulting 
Role 
 
Overall Consulting 
Role 
No 
Consulting 
Role 
 
Overall 
Outsourced IA 
Provider 
5.33 
(2.29) 
n = 15 
6.88 
(1.31) 
n = 16 
6.13 
(1.97) 
n = 31 
3.67 
(2.32) 
n = 15 
4.19 
(2.32) 
n = 16 
3.94 
(2.29) 
n = 31 
In-house IA 
Provider 
4.74 
(2.68) 
n = 19 
6.63 
(1.96) 
n = 16 
5.60 
(2.53) 
n = 35 
4.47 
(2.84) 
n = 19 
5.31 
(1.92) 
n = 16 
4.86 
(2.46) 
n = 35 
Overall 5.00 
(2.50) 
n = 34 
6.75 
(1.65) 
n = 32 
5.85 
(2.29) 
n = 66 
4.12 
(2.61) 
n = 34 
4.75 
(2.17) 
n = 32 
4.42 
(2.41) 
n = 66 
*11-point scale (0 [to a very limited extent] – 10 [to a very great extent]) 
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Table 2 
Paired sample comparisons of overall reliance decisions 
 
Panel A: Internal control evaluation paired with substantive testing of balances  
 Means  
(Std. dev.) 
Paired Differences 
 Control 
Evaluation  
Substantive 
Testing  
Mean 
(Std. dev) 
t P value 
Work Undertaken 6.05 
(1.78) 
4.11  
(2.46) 
1.94 
(2.86) 
5.509 0.000 
Using IA as Assistants 5.85  
(2.29) 
4.42  
(2.41) 
1.42 
(2.84) 
4.075 0.000 
Panel B: Work already undertaken paired with using internal auditors as assistants  
 Means  
(Std. dev.) 
Paired Differences 
 Work 
Undertaken 
Using IA as 
Assistants 
Mean 
(Std. dev) 
t P value 
Control Evaluation 6.05 
(1.78) 
5.85 
(2.29) 
0.20 
(1.74) 
0.920 0.361 
Substantive Testing 4.11  
(2.46) 
4.42  
(2.41) 
  -0.318 
(2.20) 
   -1.175 0.244 
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Table 3 
The impact of outsourcing and consultancy role on external auditors’ reliance 
decisions: Analysis of variance 
 
Panel A: Work Already Undertaken by Internal Audit (IA) 
Source of variation Evaluation of internal controls Substantive testing of balances 
 Mean 
Square 
F P value^ Mean 
Square 
F P value^ 
IA Provider (IAP)       .133        .044     .835       .933       .153     .697 
Consulting Role (CR)   18.534      6.115     .008       .033       .005     .942 
IAP x CR       .155        .051     .822   14.046     2.297     .135 
Panel B: Using Internal Auditors as Assistants
Source of variation Evaluation of internal controls Substantive testing of balances 
 Mean 
Square 
F P value^ Mean 
Square 
F P value^ 
IA Provider (IAP)     2.933        .635     .429    15.279       2.661    .054 
Consulting Role (CR)   48.153    10.420     .001      7.567       1.318    .127 
IAP x CR       .491        .106     .745        .414         .072    .789 
^ One-tailed when in direction predicted 
 
